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ABSTRACT European integration has had a dual impact on border regions. On the
one hand, borders were physically dismantled across most of the EU’s internal terri-
tory. On the other hand, they have become a fertile ground for territorial co-opera-
tion and institutional innovation. The degree of cross-border co-operation and
organization achieved varies considerably from one region to another depending on
a combination of various facilitating factors for effective cross-border co-operation,
more specifically, economic, political leadership, cultural/identity and state forma-
tion, and geographical factors. This article offers a conceptual framework to under-
stand the growth and diversity of cross-border regionalism within the EU context by
focusing on the levels of and drives for co-operation.
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Introduction
European integration has had a dual impact on border regions. On the
one hand, borders were physically dismantled across most of the EU’s
internal territory, but in some cases, symbolic borders, ‘the scars of Eur-
ope’s history’ as Schuman once termed them, remained in the imaginary
of peoples. On the other hand, border regions have become a fertile
ground for territorial co-operation and institutional innovation. As
Keating put it:
Borders in Europe are not disappearing has heralded under the
impact of functional restructuring, and will not do so as long as
national political and legal systems exist, but they are increasingly
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penetrated and national governments are losing their monopoly of
control over them. (Keating 1998, 182)
In recent years, divided border regions sharing a common culture and
history are re-emerging in a united Europe, partly as a consequence of
globalization, partly as a product of regional integration. This does not
automatically mean that historical fears, identities, non-visible trade barri-
ers and other institutional constraints in border regions have ceased to
exist (van Houtum 2002, 55).
New cross-border territorial units of different sizes, levels of organiza-
tion, and financial capacity are being established, to address acute social
and economic problems in border and marginal regions of countries, to
attract investment, to run common large-scale infrastructural projects and
welfare equipments, to promote cultural and educational exchanges, etc.
The degree of cross-border co-operation and institutionalization varies
considerably from one region to another depending on a combination of fac-
tors of an economic, political, cultural, historical, and geographical nature.
Much of the institutionalization of cross-border cooperation arrange-
ments in Europe has taken place outside the EU legal and institutional
framework and largely supported by the Council of Europe. Since the
1980s, the EU (at the time called EEC) has funded this cooperation
through the INTERREG programmes, whose management has been par-
tially hindered by different national laws and procedures. To solve this
problem of accountability and efficiency in the implementation of EU pro-
grammes and projects co-financed by the structural funds, a new the Euro-
pean Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) was recently created
(2006) to bring both uniformity and legal stability to co-operation with
sub-national units.
This article offers a conceptual framework to understand the growth
and diversity of cross-border regionalism within the EU context by focus-
ing on the drives for and levels of co-operation. It is organized in four
parts. The first part deals with the conceptual framework: what are border
regions and how are they evolving? In the second part, it distinguishes
between regional integration and so-called ‘co-operation processes’ and
outlines in particular the different ways of functioning of EU-financed
cross-border co-operations. The third part describes the historical institu-
tionalization process of the concept ‘cross-border co-operation’. Finally,
the article extensively examines a number of facilitating factors or drivers
of effective cross-border co-operation in Europe —— historical and cultural
empathy, pre-existing patterns of cross-border co-operation, complemen-
tary economies, the institutional capacity and preparedness of local/regio-
nal authorities to respond to the challenge(s) of European integration (its
tensions and opportunities) —— and consequently infers political
conclusions and development perspectives.
Changing Border Regions
What is a border region? A border region is not simply the extreme part
of the sovereign territory of two or more neighbouring countries divided
2 Luis De Sousa
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by a fixed jurisdictional line that separates them. It is here defined as a
special area of fluxes and exchanges of a social, cultural, economic and
political nature, a space where the development of multiple activities takes
place and where the type and intensity of transactions have evolved in
time.
More than any other part of the national territory, border regions are
sensitive to the redefinition of territorial jurisdictions. As Aron (1966) put
it, at times of war, borders are guarded forcefully and suspicion grows
upon the neighbours; in a climate of peace between states, transnational
society flourishes, border controls erode and new forms of inter-state
conflict resolution appear. Not surprisingly:
… in a booming and politically stable Europe, local players on either
side of certain European borders, depend on different systems but
sharing common problems and interests (border workers, cross-bor-
der pollution, land-use planning or security issues, etc), have tried to
join forces in order to find practical, fast solutions to their require-
ments, without having to go via the traditional channels of inter-State
relations. (Committee of the Regions 2007, 16)
Some of the internal borders of Europe are post-World War II creations.
European integration has downplayed (old) disputed border issues, but has
not solved them.
Borders are ‘social structures that are constantly communicatively repro-
duced’ (Albert, Diez, and Stetter 2008, 21) hence it is not surprising that
national (and local) elites and the media replicate in time this mental
frame, fear and suspicion upon their neighbours. As van der Velde and
van Houtum put it succinctly, ‘National borders produce an imagined
mental nearness to the members of one’s nation and an exclusion of and
mental distance to non-members, the “strangers”’ (2004, 49). In a similar
vein, Reitel writes:
La frontie`re n’est pas qu’une simple limite politique, elle est aussi et
surtout un objet se´mique qui se´pare deux socie´te´s et leur permet de
se distinguer et de s’identifier… Elle a une porte´e symbolique a` laqu-
elle est associe´e une forme mate´rielle: un dispositive militaire, des
postes de douanes, la presence de symbols de l’Etat comme les drape-
aux, une ligne trace´e sur les cartes, etc. (Reitel 2010, 292)
What is surprising is the fact that this social reproduction of borders
continues to happen in a context of debordering, downsizing of the state
and increasing business opportunities and regional co-operation pro-
grammes funded by the EU. Some regions have been able to overcome this
mental frame and produce a discourse that tries to enhance cross-border
co-operation; other regions have remained with their back turned to their
neighbours.
For all these reasons, border regions are an adequate level for testing
EU integration theories. These are well-defined territorial areas that have
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witnessed the breakdown of borders and customs with the establishment
of the single market, the achievement of the monetary union and the intro-
duction of a single currency (Eurozone) as well as the abolition of border
controls under the Schengen convention.
The key focus of the European integration process has been to signifi-
cantly reduce the relevance of national borders for European eco-
nomic players, in order to create a large market in which national
borders no longer stand in the way of the free movement of workers,
goods, services and capital. (Committee of the Regions 2007, 16)
Border regions constitute a privileged space to analyse how fluxes and
exchanges of goods, peoples and capital have evolved in time and to what
extent the process of integration is responsible for the increment of those
transactions. They are equally a privileged space to access the impact of
European integration upon institutional performance and co-operation at
the executive level between local units (regions and/or local authorities)
from two neighbouring countries. The progress made by European integra-
tion increases the need for cross-border co-operation not only to foster the
four freedoms (labour, goods, services and capital), but also to oversee
how these fluxes take place with what impact, to strengthen cultural and
linguistic ties between regions separated in different national jurisdictions
and to rationalize the provision of public services in a cross-border territo-
rial logic. Finally, they offer a unique space to assess the symbolic/identity
impact of the removal State political borders or the attenuation of border
controls.
The setting up of the single market has led to a profound change of the
border structures. Debordering paved by European integration is a multi-
faceted process. Further to the withdrawal of jurisdictional controls, deb-
ordering also led to the transformation of neighbouring relations (national
identity discourses lost their meaning; co-operation became the new buzz-
word in cross-border institutional relations); the increase of economic
transactions; and the revival of divided cultural communities and border
traditions.
Cross-border movements of all types have increased as a result of Euro-
pean integration and globalization. The single market has created opportu-
nities and incentives for cross-border co-operation, but there are still many
stumbling blocks to citizens who work, live and go to school across the
border, non-visible trade barriers and obstacles to co-operation in various
policy sectors (e.g., environmental issues, police co-operation, contingency
planning, public transport links, provision of health services and so on).
Levels of Cross Border Co-operation
Regional co-operation is a different process from integration even if both
are interrelated.
European integration is a system of interregional co-operation and inter-
dependence in which states parties to a founding treaty abdicate part of
4 Luis De Sousa
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [b
-o
n: 
Bi
bli
ote
ca
 do
 co
nh
ec
im
en
to 
on
lin
e U
L]
 at
 06
:12
 04
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
12
 
their sovereignty to a supranational body, thus departing from a unani-
mous decision-making process and reducing the likelihood of gridlock in
policy areas where member states expect to be better served by pooling
sovereignty than by dealing with them alone or via traditional bilateral
diplomacy and multilateral arrangements.
European integration remains mostly an international relations concept:
a (irreversible) political process between member states. The microcosm of
regional integration has been given less attention the mainstream literature
on the topic.
Co-operation, on the other hand, it is a voluntary process in which
states or sub-national territorial units act together for a common purpose
or benefit without pooling sovereignty to a supranational body. Although
co-operation generates interdependence, it does not require a formal agree-
ment to take place and each implicated state or territorial unit retains its
own sovereignty capacity untouched.
Regional co-operation can take place outside the framework of the EU,
but European integration offers member states or sub-national territorial
units new opportunities and incentives to cooperate in the pursuit of their
objectives. However, these opportunities and incentives have not always
been mobilized to foster interregional co-operation and cross-border co-
operation in particular.
What does it mean cross-border co-operation? Article 2.1 of the 1980
‘Madrid Convention’ defines transfrontier co-operation as:
… any concerted action designed to reinforce and foster neighbourly
relations between territorial communities or authorities within the
jurisdiction of two or more Contracting Parties and the conclusion of
any agreement and arrangement necessary for this purpose.
In operational terms, cross-border co-operation can be defined as any type
of concerted action between public and/or private institutions of the bor-
der regions of two (or more) states, driven by geographical, economic, cul-
tural/identity, political/leadership factors, with the objective of reinforcing
the (good) neighbourhood relations, solving common problems or manag-
ing jointly resources between communities through any co-operation
mechanisms available.
This definition is sufficiently broad to include the simple town twinning
to the celebration of an international treaty for managing common
resources (e.g., the Rhine navigation treaty). It also stresses the role of pri-
vate actors in the implementation of government-led cross-border co-oper-
ation programmes.
Cross-border co-operation is a complex phenomenon and has its origins
due to the interplay of a number of factors and circumstances. Border
regions seek co-operation efforts or agreements whenever (Committee of
the Regions 2009, 3–4):
• There is an overlap of interests.
• There is a shared historical memory.
Understanding European Cross-border Cooperation 5
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• There is a strong interdependence between the two regions due to
geographical or economic factors.
• There is a political objective for future joint action.
The objective of the bordering authorities and private actors involved in
these territorial co-operation arrangements is:
… to offset the structural disadvantages imposed by their location,
on the edge of their country and confined by the limits placed on the
system (legal, economic, social, or even linguistic, cultural, religious,
etc) as a result of proximity to an international border. (Committee
of the Regions 2007, 16)
These drives produce different types of co-operation practices and
arrangements, imposing different levels of commitment from the parties
involved:
(1) Awareness raising co-operation. Cross-border ‘good neighbourhood
relations’ are but one type of motivation that leads regions to coop-
erate. This is the type of cross-border co-operation that requires the
lowest level of political commitment. As Harguinde´guy put it: ‘Le
niveau de plus faible intensite´ territoriale corresponde a` la para
diplomatie transfrontalie`re. Il s’agit de contacts re´guliers entre zones
contigue¨s, souvent conditionne´s par la proximite´ et la similarite´ des
proble`mes a` affronter’ (2007, 11). Regular bilateral visits or town
twinning arrangements to promote cultural and commercial ties, are
the most emblematic examples of this type of co-operation.
(2) Mutual aid co-operation. Mutual aid is an agreement among emer-
gency responders from both sides of the border to lend assistance
across jurisdictional boundaries. This may occur due to an emer-
gency response that exceeds local resources, such as natural or man-
provoked disasters. Mutual aid co-operation may take place on an
ad hoc basis, requested only when such an emergency occurs, or it
may also be a formal standing arrangement for cooperative risk or
emergency management on a continuing basis between bordering
public authorities.
(3) Functional co-operation. Other co-operation arrangements are more
permanent, requiring greater resources and a higher degree of com-
mitment from the neighbouring local/regional political and adminis-
trative authorities. These co-operation projects aim at solving
problems, creating business opportunities, promoting cultural
exchanges and reducing non-visible barriers to labour mobility
through the implementation of joint co-operation projects, such as
the INTERREG programmes.1
Typically, cross-border initiatives have a functional basis, focused on
common problems and opportunities, notably in economic develop-
ment, promotion, infrastructure, environment and sometimes culture,
6 Luis De Sousa
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but they also have a strong political component, founded on the
desire of regional politicians to project themselves on a wider stage,
or to escape the restrictions of national politics. Their success or fail-
ure depends on the appropriateness of the functional linkages estab-
lished, as well as on the political dynamics, including the attitude of
national and local governments. (Keating 1998, 181)
The implementation of these joint initiatives fosters institutional capaci-
tation: the increased volume and complexity of legal and administrative
materials, forces border region authorities to adjust their administrative
structures and to train their officials on various cross-border policy
matters to run these programmes.
(4) Common management of public resources/services. Finally, a more
restricted number of co-operation arrangements goes beyond the
implementation of EU regional funds and seeks joint strategies to
reorganize and rationalize state services, benefits and other public
funded provisions in function of border regions rather than being
based on state interests and jurisdictions. Despite the apparent func-
tional logic of restructuring and rationalizing, it is not easy to put in
place public policies across national borders (Keating 1998, 182).
Amongst the major obstacles are the lack of financial autonomy of
the Euro-regions to pursue these cross-border integrated projects
and the fact that these are government-led processes and therefore
subject to political logics which are not necessarily harmonious with
cross-border designs.
This taxonomy of cross-border cooperation distinguishes between vary-
ing degrees of cross-border co-operation according to the complexity of
the institutional arrangements, the degree of political commitment needed
to put them in place, the amount of resources involved and the outcomes
or externalities produced for the local economy and populations. How-
ever, it is not implicit that the categories are exclusive or that there is an
hierarchical and automatic sequence between these different co-operation
arrangements: mutual aid co-operation may take place to address a partic-
ular emergency or calamity (for example, a river flood), whilst neighbour-
ing regional governments are seeking to put in place a joint infrastructural
project for mutual benefit of their local populations (for example, a dam
to stop river flooding).
The regularity and complexity of cross-border relations may lead border
region authorities to institutionalize co-operation arrangements. The
Euro-region2 and more recently the European Grouping of Territorial
Co-operation (EGTC) tend to appear associated to these two last levels of
cross-border co-operation: the implementation of joint projects and the
administration of public resources on a functional logic. They usually do
not correspond to any legislative or governmental institution, do not have
direct political power, and their work is limited to the competencies of the
local and regional authorities that constitute them.
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The impact of the macro processes of European integration in border
regions have not been homogenous, hence the institutionalization of cross-
border co-operation arrangements have also varied from one border region
to another (Caramelo 2007, 37). Some Euro-regions may display a more
transfrontier character with a permanent administrative structure (secretar-
iat and a technical and administrative staff) with own resources; other
function as a regular forum composed of representatives from different
local and regional authorities on either side of the border. Most are consti-
tuted as non-profit-making associations or foundations on either side of
the border in accordance with the respective national law in force; other
are of a public law nature, based on inter-state agreements, dealing among
other things, with the participation of territorial authorities.
The promoters of the Euro-regions usually present these functional enti-
ties as a micro-model of European integration, ‘a kind of Europe closer to
the citizens, a bottom-up approach to Europe’ (Pasi 2007, 73). In reality,
however, most of these entities remain unknown to the local populations,
which they are supposed to serve.
A more realist approach interprets the proliferation of Euro-regions as
partially fund-driven. Many of these entities have been created to adminis-
ter EU financial programmes available for border regions, such as the
INTERREG, which are designed and implemented according to the visions
of the European Commission and member states, and not necessarily in
line with cross-border interests (Heddebaut 2004, 77; Caramelo 2007,
80–4). The Euro-regions’ dependency on the financial instruments is con-
siderable. Often they established secretariats that are funded via ‘technical
assistance’ funds, which are the component of INTERREG programmes
aimed at establishing the administrative infrastructure for the local deploy-
ment of this financial instrument. For that reason, regardless of the degree
of political autonomy of border regions within their national jurisdiction,
these territorial co-operation arrangements tend to involve central govern-
ments to varying degrees.
However, the growth of Euro-regions in the EU context cannot be disas-
sociated from the increased power claims that regional/local actors are
making upon the state. Border regions seek to learn from each other and
to exploit complementary assets and skills in pursuing their own develop-
ment projects, and in doing so they have come to contest the monopoly of
the state as a welfare provider at the fringes of its national territory. Euro-
pean governance created new opportunities and incentives for cross-border
co-operation by enabling regions and Euro-regions in particular to influ-
ence the EU policy process beyond national mediation. Some border
regions might feel they are better off negotiating directly with Brussels
than if their claims were to be mediated by the respective national
governments.
In short, some forms of cross-border co-operation have remained infor-
mal and sporadic; other have taken arrangements to higher levels of politi-
cal commitment, through the setting up of new associative entities, with
or without legal status,3 in which local and regional authorities on either
side of the border work together according to public or private law
8 Luis De Sousa
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formats. Such entities have grown in numbers in recent years, but most of
them are still unknown to the majority of citizens, thus raising questions
concerning their purpose and legitimacy.
Cross-border Co-operation Within the EU
For most of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the institutionalization process
of Euro-regions proceeded at pace outside the EU legal framework, but in
parallel to the process of European integration. As Pasi observed:
During the years, the areas involved in cross-border co-operation and
those involved in European integration were practically the same…
The parallelism of the two phenomena became more and more evi-
dent during the Nineties with the diffusion of Euroregions on the
eastern borders of the European Community. (Pasi 2007, 73, 74)
Since the 1960s, the Council of Europe has been a major promoter of
cross-border co-operation as a means to help the diffusion of local democ-
racy and good neighbouring relations. In 1980, the Council of Europe
launched the Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between
Territorial Communities or Authorities,4 also called the ‘Madrid Conven-
tion’, providing a legal framework and model agreements, both for the
inter-state and the local levels, for the establishment of cross-border regions.
This was the first step to the regulation of Euro-regions at the European
level, clarifying the legal nature and scope of these entities. To date, the
Convention has been ratified by more than 20 Council of Europe Members.
In 1971, the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR)5 was
established with the specific mission of acting for the benefit of all Euro-
pean border and cross-border regions, by making their particular prob-
lems, opportunities, tasks and projects intelligible; representing their
overall interests to national and international parliaments, organs,
authorities and institutions; initiating, supporting and coordinating their
co-operation throughout Europe (creation of a network); and exchanging
know-how and information in order to formulate and coordinate common
interests on the basis of the various cross-border problems and opportuni-
ties, and to offer adequate solutions (Statutes of AEBR, amended on 25
November 1994).
As mentioned above, there is ‘a certain parallelism between the process
of European integration and the development of cross-border co-operation
and Euroregions’ (Pasi 2007, 74). The first experience was the EUREGIO
project in 1958. Since then, more than one hundred Euro-regions were
created within the EU context, some including cross-border co-operation
arrangements with non-EU neighbour states, such as Ukraine, Serbia or
Moldova.6
The first set of Euro-regions appeared shortly after the signing of the
Treaties of Rome, in the Dutch–German border (Euregio 1958), Lake
Constance (1972), the Rhine valley (1973, 1976), the Benelux area (1980,
19847) and the Scandinavian countries (1971, 1972, 1978, 1980).
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From the initial core of six, only Italy joined later this process. Italy’s
approach to cross-border co-operation was somewhat different. The
dynamic of disintegration was stronger than that of integration:
The late involvement of Italy in cross-border co-operation derived
from a problematic approach to the borders with discussions about
the borders themselves (with Yugoslavia and Austria) and about the
numerous ethnic minorities. (Pasi 2007, 74)
The reunification of Germany and the establishment of democracy in the
former communist countries of the Eastern block brought a new impulse to
the development of Euro-regions (Bufon and Markelj 2010, 21). In
anticipation of enlargement, and before the adhesion negotiations had been
completed, the new Central and Eastern European democracies were bridg-
ing with Old Europe through new forms of territorial co-operation. If
during the 1960s and 1970s, the Euro-regions were regarded as
‘instruments for a more diffused co-operation inside the Community’, in the
1990s they became ‘instruments to prepare for the joining of the EU’ (Pasi
2007, 76).
The map of territorial co-operation within the EU has changed radically
with the establishment of the single market programme. As the process of
European integration deepened, and instruments of compensation for the
least developed regions were put in place, as part of the single market ini-
tiative, cross-border co-operation boomed (Keating 1998, 180–1). By the
end of the 1980s, the EU begun to develop a series of financial
instruments designed to promote territorial development and interregional
co-operation in the less developed and peripheral areas of the EU member
states and the new democratized Central and Eastern European countries,
such as the INTERREG, PHARE–CBR and TACIS programmes8 (Bufon
and Markelj 2010, 21).
A new doctrine of cross-border territorial co-operation was gradually
being shaped under the broader community banner of ‘social and eco-
nomic cohesion’ adopted with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. By the early,
1990s, the European Commission took the lead as:
… the primary sponsor of a range of transnational and cross-border
institutional initiatives, ranging from the planning of large-scale
macro-regions encompassing two or more nation states… the devel-
opment of inter-regional and transboundary urban networks; and the
support of pan-European high-speed transport infrastructure aimed at
moving Europeans further and faster than heretofore across ‘friction-
free’ European space. (Kramsch and Hooper 2004, 2)
These political developments led to the proliferation of cross-border
institutional arrangements from the Baltic States to the Balkans, from the
Black sea to the Pyrenees. By the late 1990s, ‘there was not a border in
Western Europe that was not covered by some sort of transfrontier
programme’ (Keating 1998, 180). Of all EU internal borders, the
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Portuguese-Spanish border was an exception to this trend: local and
regional authorities were taking advantage of the EU regional develop-
ment programmes, but no permanent co-operation arrangements were
being made. The few cross-border political initiatives taking place were
fund-driven and symbolic (Sidaway 2004, 173–90; Caramelo 2007, 383–
448). Not surprisingly, the first Iberian Euro-region9 —— Galicia-Norte
de Portugal (Eixo Atlaˆntico) —— was a latecomer to this institutionaliza-
tion process. It was established in 2008, 50 years after the first
Euro-region was created.
The complexity of co-operation agreements celebrated at the sub-
national level under the Madrid Convention and the need to ensure an
adequate implementation of structural, cohesion and regional funds (Zapl-
etal 2010, 16), led the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers
to set a standard territorial co-operation arrangement: the European
Grouping of Territorial Co-operation (EGTC) (Regulation (EC) 1082/
2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council adopted on 5 July
2006, under the co-decision procedure).
This new territorial cooperation tool claims two major advantages
(Committee of the Regions 2007, 8–11): on the one hand, it confers pub-
lic entities from different member states (i.e., regions, territorial authori-
ties, municipalities, bodies of public Law and associations) more
discretion to get together and institutionalize their co-operation arrange-
ments as they see fit and without going through the signature of an inter-
national convention and the adoption of statutes that require state
approval; on the other hand, it makes them more accountable and effi-
cient in the use of EU funds by granting legal personality to the new
cross-border entity.
Although it is still too early to speculate about the future of these new
institutional arrangements, the first EGTCs seem to indicate that a new
approach to territorial co-operation is emerging: whereas traditional Euro-
regions were mainly cross-border neighbourhood units based on large
transnational cooperation basins whose scope and competences were nego-
tiated between national governments, EGTCs are ‘defined bottom-up on
the basis of common needs, assets and a dense agglomeration of shared
policy-making’ (Spinaci and Vara-Arribas 2009, 8).
For the time being, Euro-regions and EGTCs co-exist, but the future
may unfold a different reality. Because the Committee of the Regions
(CoR) has a specific consultative role in matters concerning cross-border
cooperation (under Article 306 of the Treaty), and since the EU is provid-
ing funding for these new units, the likelihood is that EGTCs will over-
come Euro-regions as models of cross-border cooperation and the CoR
will become a major actor in that process. In effect, since 2008, the CoR
has provided political support for the full implementation of the EGTC
Regulation: it has passed two opinions on this matter, created a European
Registry for the EGTCs, promoted networking amongst EGTC authorities
and experts, organised high-level meetings and launched a large consulta-
tion in 2010. This is a clear sign of the leading role that the CoR wants to
assume in this domain.
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Why Certain Regions Cooperate and Others Don’t? Drivers of
Cross-border Co-operation
There is no single explanation as to why certain border regions cooperate
and others do not. Cross-border co-operation is the result of the interplay
of various drivers or facilitating factors. The way these combine varies
from one border region to another.
Economic Drivers
One of the reasons for cross-border co-operation rests on local economic
structures and dynamics:
Classical economic theory would suggest that the removal of barriers
to trade, capital flows and labour mobility would lead to an equaliza-
tion of production levels and living standards. Capital would move to
depressed areas to take advantage of surplus labour and lower costs,
and labour would migrate to growing areas in search of employment
and higher wages. (Keating 1998, 162)
In other words, cross-border economic exchanges are unlikely to grow
with debordering where border regions display completely different or
completely identical economic structures. The functional logic of cross-
border ‘Co-operation requires a degree of complementarity and an obser-
vable opportunity to exploit these’ (Keating 1998, 181).
Since co-operation is about opportunities, it raises different stakes to
different players. Some economic actors will push for further co-operation,
whereas others will remain indifferent. Locally based SMEs who wish to
expand are, generally speaking, in favour of cross-border co-operation.
They are the strong defenders of a functional logic of transnational indus-
trial districts and science and technology parks. Large firms, on the oppo-
site hand, have little interest in small-scale cross-border initiatives because
they operate in the global economy: ‘[they] have their own connections,
are linked more directly into global networks, and do not depend on the
external economies of scale provided by proximity’ (Keating 1998, 181).
Neo-functionalists argued that the growing trade exchanges and labour
mobility paved by geographical proximity and economic complementarity
would force political actors to respond to this mounting demand for dee-
per cross-border co-operation. Success in specific programmes or policy
areas would result in a spill over demand for further co-operation in other
areas. However, the belief that this more intense cross-border co-operation
would lead to an erosion of symbolic borders and to amalgamation of the
local populations on both sides of the border remains a utopia.
The reality of micro integration is more complex. Most of these
exchanges pass through the filter of institutions and the culture and inter-
ests of actors. Increased functional cross-border co-operation does not nec-
essarily lead to greater social and political integration: ‘There is no
automatic spillover form functional integration across the border into
political and social integration. Rather, political considerations are prior
and linkages are dominated by public officials’ (Keating 1998, 182–3).
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Political Leadership Drivers
The improvement of government relations between neighbouring countries
can have a positive impact on mobility and co-operation rates in border
regions by increasing the number of partnership projects and private
investments. In other words, a stable climate of inter-governmental co-
operation allows for interregional co-operation, which, in its turn, can
facilitate cross-border business initiatives.
Further to the existence of complementarity assets within each region,
cross border co-operation also requires precise projects to realise them, the
availability of resources and an adequate organizational structure to carry
these out, and a good doses of political commitment.
Cross-border co-operation involves a variety of actors with different
roles, perspectives and commitments. The position for or against depends
on the old realpolitik formula ‘Who gets what, when and how?’: what
degree of co-operation is envisaged, what resources will be used or redi-
rected to achieve it; and what implications will the new co-operation
arrangements have upon the balances-of-power between the different tiers
of government and local business interests.
The belief that cross-border co-operation processes are always supported
by local populations and business communities is illusory. The first
Euro-regions that emerged in Europe’s trade belt were supported by local
associations and entrepreneurs (bottom up cross-border co-operation), but
these tend to constitute an exception rather than the rule. The majority of
Euro-regions are politically led projects (top down cross-border
co-operation). In other words, ‘Euroregions don’t automatically mean the
involvement of citizens in the process of micro and macro integration’
(Pasi 2007, 76). This being said, once Euro-regions are established and
their work becomes an asset to the daily life of local populations, it helps
to diffuse a ‘European way of thinking’.
The belief that local political actors are devoted to cross-border co-oper-
ation without economic considerations is also erroneous. Local politicians
tend to regard cross-border co-operation arrangements as a mechanism to
access additional resources (Scott 2000; Kramsch and Hooper 2004; Pasi
2007) and pressure for EU funded public investment on infrastructural
and business promotion projects to their region (Heddebaut 2004, 84).
However, the gains of cross-border co-operation and their redistribution
obey to a competitive logic.
Political actors on each side of the border have to respond to their own
constituencies and clienteles, and this is not always consistent with cross-
border objectives. The question is how to make co-operation a positive
sum to both sides, so that sectoral interests on either side of the border do
not interpret these projects as a threat to their interests, but on the con-
trary, see it as an opportunity for development and better quality of life.
This is the reason why compensation instruments have to be put in place.
Cross-border co-operation works on top of these very fragile balances
and compromises, and this has important implications in terms of public
spending. Not surprisingly, EU regional development financial instruments
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are often designed and implemented according to national political priori-
ties and interests, instead of a European rationale.
Cross-border co-operation can become purely symbolic, budget-driven
and characterized by a series of window dressing initiatives with no struc-
tural impact to the market players and the local populations:
Frequently, joint programmes amount to little more than parallel
efforts, separately mounted, or the relabeling of existing activities. Only
in specific projects, such as a river crossing or an environmental clean-
up, is genuinely joint action commonly found. (Keating 1998, 182)
The degree of success of these joint co-operation projects is also depen-
dent on the structure, competences and resources of border local/regional
authorities. Co-operation requires that the sub-national authorities in ques-
tion have sufficient institutional capacity to enter and participate actively
in these cross-border arrangements (Keating 1998, 181; Hala´s 2007, 24).
Last but not least, success in achieving cross-border co-operation
depends, to a large extent, on individual political entrepreneurs, their con-
tinued interest and ability to mobilize local support to these initiatives
(Keating 1998, 182; Heddebaut 2004, 82; Hala´s 2007, 29).
Cultural/Identity and State Formation Drivers
The founders of the European Union had long heralded ‘a borderless Eur-
ope’ in which European peoples kept their cultural differences, but no
longer regarded each other with contempt. They had to believe that a
richer European culture and identity would emerge out of the growing
fluxes of exchanges and mobility. The American analogy of the melting
pot as the final product of integration was in the back of their minds.
The state as a territorially defined political unit has historically encapsu-
lated a community with particular cultural attributes, but it has never been
a sealed reality. The borders have always been porous: ‘no place can be
considered as a self-contained system. Boundaries are unstable and fluctu-
ating, yet a sense of place often remains’ (Keating 1998, 8).
For that reason, this sense of space has been socially reproduced and
transmitted in time through identity building processes, such as: the adop-
tion of national conscription (military service often removed young men
from the ignorant peasantry at the fringes and inculcated an ideology of
nationalism); the introduction of universal education; the standardization
of a national language and value systems; etc.
The becoming of an independent nation-state meant the elimination of
competing regional integration processes and cultural deracination at the
fringes. State building presupposes integration of a given community under
the same jurisdiction: ‘A territorial society has a cohesive identity’
(Keating 1998, 1). As Reitel explained:
Pour les E´tats, la territorialisation consiste notamment a` reduire l’he´t-
e´roge´ne´ite´ culturelle et l’anisotropie. L’E´tat produit ainsi un ensemble
de symbols qui vont contribuer a` renforcer la cohesion nationale. Il
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construit un syste`me se´mique qui va permettre de distinguer son terri-
toire des autres territories. Ce syste´me se pre´sente comme une com-
binaison qui comprend plusiers dimensions: juridique, fiscale et
militaire. La congruence des dimensions sur une meme ligne souligne
l’e´mergence de consciences identitaires. (Reitel 2010, 292)
The territorial dimension of the State shapes local populations’ identity
and perceptions about their neighbours and have a structural impact on
levels of cross-border co-operation. As van der Velde and van Houtum
explained, the low level of cross-border labour mobility ‘is not merely a
matter of failing to recognize opportunities because of existing differ-
ences’, but ‘a matter of indifference towards the ‘Other side’, the ‘market’
across the border’ (2004, 51). In principle, it is more common that border
regions sharing similar language, cultural elements and value systems find
it easier to trust each other and cooperate. Not surprisingly, one of the
early cross-border co-operation institutional arrangements in Europe took
place between the Scandinavian countries.
Historically, however, language has not played a constraining role on
levels of cross-border commercial transactions and/or institutional co-
operation. Europe’s Roman trade-route belt, from the Italic peninsula to
the Hanseatic bay was composed of city states and leagues with different
cultural, religious and linguistic traits, and this has never constituted an
obstacle to intense trade flows and capital accumulation. On the con-
trary, the founding member states of the EU and the early Euro-regions
are located in this geographical area and constitute the nucleus of what
is today the European Union. According to Stein Rokkan (1999, 167–8),
it is no accident of history that Europe’s city-belt displays a higher pro-
pensity for regional integration and cross-border co-operation. The fact
that consociational or confederate state-formation process may produce
more permeable border identities should not be overlooked as an
explanatory hypothesis for more frequent and durable cross-border
co-operation.
There is continuity between the formation of the modern state system in
Europe and the construction of Europe. The mode of how a border was
drawn, peacefully or violently —— by war, winner-takes-it-all peace settle-
ments, secession and other border conflicts —— has an impact on cross-
border co-operation, in particular in young borders (Langer 2007, 17).
Although many of the Euro-regions arrangements in Central and Eastern
Europe internal borders are better characterized as a pre-accession or
fund-driven strategy, one should not downplay the weight of history in
the region. Paraphrasing Rokkan, the remarked variations in the degree of
cross-border co-operation and integration processes achieved at the micro
and macro levels are part of a broader trajectory of European political
development from the collapse of the Roman Empire until the present,
hence they cannot be explained ‘without going far back in history, without
analysing the differences in the initial conditions and the early processes of
territorial organisation, of state building, of resource combination’ (1999,
135).
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Geographical Drivers
Geography is often the most important driver to functional co-operation
as it forces neighbouring authorities to negotiate, implement and adminis-
ter joint infrastructure projects, such as the construction of a bridge, road,
dam, etc. Environmental policy issues (such as the use of water from
shared rivers) and judicial co-operation (in particular with regard to cross-
border criminality and terrorism) can also produce positive-sum outcomes
to neighbouring authorities.
Border regions where accessibility differences are not so pronounced are
likely to see their co-operation intents facilitated. Having said this, the
Channel Tunnel is a good example of how accessibility obstacles can be
overcome by business interests and political will.
Geography facilitates cross-border political initiatives to control or man-
age shared concerns and assets, but does not necessarily lead to greater
rationalization of resources. As already mentioned, national and local poli-
ticians respond to their own constituencies, hence they have little interest
in entering co-operation arrangements that might result in a withdrawal of
services from their region in favour of common public services, supported
by common budgets and policy objectives, unless some compensation
mechanisms are put in place. Moreover, their mandates are limited in time
and some of these arrangements would take a few years to produce visible
results, hence without any electoral appeal. More often than not, there is
a waste of resources because there is a duplication of services that could
serve contiguous regions.
Conclusion
Cross-border co-operation is a learning process. What we are witnessing
today is an extraordinary degree of institutional experimentation at the
fringes of nation states. Not surprisingly, the European Commission
termed Euro-regions ‘the laboratories of European integration’ (Kramsch
and Hooper 2004, 3). Some of these ‘experiments’ have had a marginal
impact on local economies and the wellbeing of local populations. (In)suc-
cess should be put into perspective: the 52 years of cross-border co-opera-
tion in the context of European integration are still an infant compared to
a state system which lasted for more than 300 years.
No rapid results should be expected. Creating a new tier of regional
governance, even of a cross-border nature, ‘requires not merely that there
should be a functional logic to justify it, but also that the political condi-
tions be present for a broad coalition in support of it’ (Keating 1998, 60).
For the time being, most of the cross-border co-operation arrangements
and the institutions that embody them are political and administrative
bodies of a technocratic nature, unknown to the local populations, regard-
less of the degree of success in fulfilling their designated objectives.
Although European integration has raised various incentives for
cross-border co-operation, there are still many visible and non-visible bar-
riers inhibiting the implementation of a new tier of shared governance at
the border regions. These can be resumed in two major obstacles:
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institutional diversity and lack of financial autonomy to pursue joint pro-
grammes.
States that share borders are of a different organization nature hence
the repartition of powers and the degree of autonomy of decentralized
units varies considerably from one country to another. Some border
regions are able to conduct joint programmes because they have the lead-
ership, organizational structures, competences and resources to do so. In
other cases border political authorities (municipalities, counties, regions)
are allowed to enter co-operation agreements, but central government
remains in control of the nature and scope of the agreements and the
resources allocated to pursue it. Differences of spatial planning on state
services, industrial or technological parts and transport/communication
routes also exist across the borders and they are not easy to integrate in
order to produce a common planning based on a functional cross-border
logic rather than a state one (Heddebaut 2004, 74–5).
Another remaining problem is the strong dependency of these new enti-
ties on EU financial instruments that lack a cross-border planning vision.
Most Euro-regions are not self-financed; they live on projects and financial
programmes. Without a global budget for the Euro-regions covering the
financing of cross-border integrated projects (Heddebaut 2004, 77), the
likelihood is that the impact of these new territorial governance institu-
tions will remain marginal and limited to lower levels of co-operation (of
a symbolic rather than structural nature).
What are the implications of the expansion of Euro-regions to the wider
European project?
Cross-border co-operation arrangements have now been integrated into
the EU legal framework. The proponents of this new bottom-up approach
to territorial co-operation argue that cross-border co-operation will move
from being marginal, specialized and (often) informal set of arrangements
to become stronger, more legally certain and transparent organizational
features of the EU institutional architecture. The new EGTCs are expected
to play a greater role in setting the regional policy agenda. This may even-
tually give a new impetus to the CoR in the EU decision-making.
It is yet to be seen, whether this new approach will foster greater and
deeper territorial co-operation, as proclaimed by its proponents (Kramsch
and Hooper 2004, 3). The logics of territorial co-operation are not depen-
dent on legal frameworks, but on opportunities, incentives and political
outcomes. Success in achieving cross-border depends, to a large extent, on
the willingness of political leaders and business entrepreneurs to overcome
entrenched historical, identity and political divisions and their strong com-
mitment to Europe: ‘this provides an incentive for transfrontier initiatives
and a context and support system for them’ (Keating 1998, 183).
Finally, some authors have raised concerns whether such proliferation
of cross-border arrangements could further weaken the nation-state and
contribute to the redrawing of ‘a political Europe with administrative
structures similar to the pre-modern age, except that Europe would be
organized in Euroregions instead of dukedoms or Kingdoms’ (Langer
2007, 15). There is little evidence that Europe is evolving towards
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‘feudalization’. Instead, these new territorial units are part of a multilay-
ered and polycentric governance system in constant redefinition.
The EU is a complex process of integration that involves abolishing
and redrawing boundaries internally and externally and the emergence
of new forms of territorial co-operation. As Keating alerted, ‘territory
and function are linked in complex ways and the territorial logic of
functional processes is constantly reasserting itself, often at new and
unfamiliar territorial levels’ (1998, 3), hence it is not excluded that
the EU evolves along the lines just described. For the time being,
however, cross-border co-operation only concerns the closer border
communities and represents a marginal volume of economic transac-
tions, hence compatible with the role nation states play in the Euro-
pean construction.
Notes
1. The INTERREG is a Community financial instrument, which aims to stimulate interregional co-
operation in the European Union. It started in 1989 and is financed under the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF). The programme is divided into three strands: Interreg A, Interreg B and
Interreg C. Strand A is devoted exclusively to cross-border co-operation between adjacent regions
through joint development strategies, such as the promotion of urban, rural and coastal develop-
ment; the creation of industrial technological parks; the development of local employment initiatives
in particular in the tourism sector; assistance for labour market integration and social inclusion; the
improvement of transport, communication and information networks and environmental protection,
water and energy systems; etc. Interreg A is by far the largest strand in terms of budget and number
of programmes. The current programme is Interreg IV, covering the period 2007–2013.
2. Also known as Euroregion, Euregio, Euregion, Europaregion, Grand Region, Regio and Council.
In some cases, the label Euro-region is not used at all, such as the ‘Nova Raetia’, which is
composed of territorial communities of Switzerland, Italy and Austria.
3. The legal status of Euro-regions varies. It may involve a community of interests or Working
Community without legal personality or a Euro-region of public or private law nature. In some
cases these bodies are regulated by multilateral or bilateral state conventions, in other instances,
the agreements regulating these bodies are celebrated between regional/local authorities. Although,
in theory, Euro-regions are meant to have broader objectives and competences than Working Com-
munities, in practice, the dividing line between these two types of institutional cross-border
arrangements is not so clear-cut (Medeiros 2009, 55). In order to simplify the analysis, this paper
will focus only on Euro-regions.
4. For further information, please consult: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/106.htm
(available online on 29 May 2010).
5. Or ARFE —— Association des regions frontalie`res europe´ennes, in French.
6. According to the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), the number of Border and
Cross-border Regions amounts to nearly 190. For an overview of the list of existing Euro-regions,
please consult the following web sites: http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/areas_of_work/
transfrontier_cooperation/euroregions/euroregions_EN.asp(available online 31 May 2012); http://
www.euregio.nrw.de/links.html(available online 31 May 2012); http://www.aebr.eu/en/members/
list_of_members.php(available online 31 May 2012).
7. It should be noticed, however, that the Benelux custom’s union was ratified in 1947, ten years
before the signing of the Treaties of Rome (1957).
8. PHARE–CBR —— Poland–Hungary Assistance for Restructuring the Economy —— Cross-border
Relations. TACIS —— Technical Assistance to the Community of Independent States.
9. The second Iberian Euro-region ‘EURO ACE’, which comprises three Iberian border regions ——
Alentejo (Portugal), Centre (Portugal) and Extremadura (Spain) —— was founded on 21 September
2009 and the third, the ‘EURO AAA’ was created on 5 May 2010 between the border regions of
Alentejo (Portugal), Algarve (Portugal) and the Andalusia (Spain).
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